Special Standing Committee

[Mrs. Marion Roe in the Chair]

Adoption and Children Bill

Jim Fitzpatrick: On a point of order, Mrs. Roe. I would like the Programming Sub-Committee to have a brief meeting five minutes after the adjournment of this morning's sitting, so that we can discuss Report stage. It is a matter of which I have apprised the Opposition parties, and I hope that it meets with your approval.

Marion Roe: The request has been made that the Programming Sub-Committee meet after this morning's sitting. I am content that such a meeting should be held, and that it should begin five minutes after the questions are put at 1 pm, so that the Room can be prepared for the private meeting.Clause 88 Restriction on arranging adoptions, etc.

Clause 88 - Restriction on arranging adoptions, etc.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: Welcome back, Mrs. Roe, to the final furlong of this lengthy Bill. It will be a great shame, after this week, not to have our Tuesday and Thursday sittings to look forward to.
 The clauses on restrictions to be debated this morning contain little that is contentious, so I hope that we can make progress and move on to the amendments and new clauses, which are of greater interest. However, I hope that the Minister will elaborate on the extent of the restrictions on arranging adoptions. In particular, I cannot see how the provision applies to those accused of trying to arrange adoptions over the internet; given recent cases, I want to be sure that all loopholes are closed. The matter might be covered in another of the clauses that we are about to debate, but I hope that the Minister will assure the Committee that all the loopholes have been closed and that people who are not authorised to do so will be prevented from arranging adoptions.

Jacqui Smith: I will say a few words about the extent of clause 88, but first I shall answer the question asked by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) about internet adoptions. Adoption advertisements on the internet are covered by clause 113, which we shall debate later this morning.
 Clause 88 deals with restrictions on arranging adoptions. It restates, with some amendments, section 11 of the Adoption Act 1976. I am sure that all hon. Members agree that it is essential that the welfare and needs of children are safeguarded: the protection and care of vulnerable children is our first priority. There are those who are prepared to engage in buying or selling children for adoption, but even if 
 money does not change hands, no one should be permitted to arrange private adoptions. The welfare of the child must be paramount, and only those who are properly qualified and trained should arrange adoptions. 
 I shall briefly list the provisions of the clause so that the Committee is clear about the various restrictions it imposes. Subsection (1) makes it clear that only local authorities and registered adoption agencies, and those acting in accordance with a High Court order, should make arrangements for adoption. That provision is subject to subsection (4), which provides that the prohibition does not apply to the taking of certain steps if one or both of the prospective adopters are parents, relatives or guardians of the child, or if a prospective adopter is a step-parent. Clause 88 maintains the current legal position, but provides greater clarity than section 11 of the 1976 Act and the previous version of the Bill by listing in subsection (2) those steps that should not be taken by anyone unless an adoption agency is involved. 
 The step in paragraph (a) is asking a person to provide a child for adoption, for example, where a person asks a birth parent or a third party to supply a child; and in paragraph (b) asking a person to provide prospective adopters, for example, where the birth parent approaches a third party, such as an intermediary, and asks him to provide adopters for her child. The step in paragraph (c) is 
''offering to find a child for adoption'',
 for example, where X approaches Y and suggests that he can locate a child for Y to adopt. In paragraph (d), it is 
''offering a child for adoption''—
 where X, a parent of a child or an intermediary, has identified a child who could be adopted and makes a direct proposal about that child to Y. 
 The step in paragraph (e) is handing over a child for the purpose of adoption by the person who receives him or by someone else, for example, X takes and gives the child to Y for adoption, or X takes and gives the child to Z, so that he can hand the child over to Y for adoption. Paragraph (f) covers receiving a child for the purpose of adoption in contravention of paragraph (e): that would catch Y for taking the child from either X or Z, and catch Z for receiving a child from X to hand the child over to Y. I was thinking of preparing a flow chart, but I hope that the use of letters, particularly if people pore over my remarks later, will make clear the different restrictions. 
 Paragraph (g) covers 
''entering into an agreement with any person for the adoption of a child, or for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of a child, where no adoption agency is acting on behalf of the child''.
 That would catch both X and Y in their bargaining or agreement for the adoption of the child by Y; it would also catch Z for helping to facilitate the arrangement under paragraph (e), or in any other way assisting X and Y in the adoption of the child. Paragraph (h) covers 
''initiating or taking part in negotiations of which the purpose is the conclusion of an agreement within paragraph (g)''
 for the adoption of a child or an agreement to facilitate the adoption of a child. In my example, it would also catch a new character, W, who has no role in the illicit adoption other than opening negotiations between X and Y by introducing them to each other for the purpose. Another example would be a person who participated in the negotiations in a mediating role. Finally, paragraph (i) restricts 
''causing another person to take any of the steps mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (h).''
 That final step catches anyone who does not take any of the aforementioned steps himself, but induces another person to do so. 
 Clause 88(3) and (4) provides that the prohibition does not apply to the taking of certain steps where one or both of the prospective adopters are parents, relatives or guardians of the child, or where a prospective adopter is a step-parent. The steps that do not apply are paragraphs (d), (e), (g), (h) and (i) of subsection (2). 
 That is probably sufficient explanation of the intentions behind the clause, and I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: I am grateful. The clause has been made terribly clear and we can proceed.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 88 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 90 - Restriction on reports

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: The clause is not terribly contentious—[Interruption.]

Marion Roe: Order.

Hilton Dawson: I am sorry, Mrs. Roe.

Tim Loughton: However, there seem to be a lot of let-outs. We agree that people who are not authorised to do so should not produce reports on prospective adoptions. However, subsection (4) provides that
''Where a person is charged with an offence under subsection (2)(b), it is a defence for him to prove that he neither knew nor had reasonable cause to believe that the report would be, or had been, prepared in contravention of subsection (1).''
 In my experience, ignorance of the law is no defence. Anybody could say that they did not realise that a report would be used for the purposes of adoption. I should have thought that there ought to be a greater onus on a person who prepares literature akin to that which would be required for promoting an adoption. Does not subsection (4) give too lenient a let-out for the clause to be effective?

Jacqui Smith: Perhaps I can reassure the hon. Gentleman by outlining the restrictions in the clause. The intention is to cover cases of domestic and intercountry adoption in which couples seek to
 circumvent the safeguards by commissioning private social workers to write inaccurate favourable reports to support their adoption applications. The clause permits only properly qualified people employed by or working on behalf of adoption agencies to carry out home study assessment reports and post-placement and post-adoption reports. We want to ensure that such reports are impartial and accurate. They are an essential part of the decision-making process, which exists to safeguard the interests of the child and to make an appropriate match between the child and adoptive parents. There is a further risk that placements may be disrupted by private report writers working on post-adoption reports, which are sometimes requested in intercountry adoptions by the country of the child's origin to monitor the way in which a placements is working, as is the case with adoptions from China and the Philippines.
 The clause provides for restrictions on the preparation of adoption reports. Under subsection (1), we shall be able to specify that only qualified people in registered adoption societies, agencies or local authorities are able to prepare and write those essential documents, which play a key role in informing decisions in the adoption process. Unqualified and unregulated individuals should not be able to prepare home assessments on prospective adopters or post-placement or post-adoption reports. Under subsection (2), an offence is committed when someone prepares a report that contravenes subsection (1), or causes a person to prepare or submit such a report. Under subsection (3), when a person who works for an adoption society that is not registered commits an offence, the manager is also guilty of the offence. That ensures that the manager of an adoption support service is penalised, as his organisation is not registered.

Tim Loughton: A point that I had meant to mention in connection with the previous clause is equally relevant to this one. Who are we talking about when we refer to ''illegitimate'' adoption societies—ones that are not registered? What is the target of the clause? Is the problem a big one?

Jacqui Smith: I shall come to that after I have dealt with defence points.
 Under subsection (4), we consider the basis on which a defence could be provided for a person charged with an offence of causing a person to prepare or submitting to any person a report in contravention of subsection (2). The hon. Gentleman argues that the defence is too lenient and may allow people to evade the intention of the clause. However, the defence is used in other legislation and, most importantly, it applies to subsection (3)(b) alone. It applies not to the person who actually prepares the report but to those who may receive the report without realising that it has not been prepared properly. 
 The measure does not give a let-out on the basis that they did not know the law to an unqualified or unregulated individual who prepares that report. The defence of not knowing or having reasonable cause to believe is included in a range of other legislation. If the hon. Gentleman is interested, I can go through some examples; I assure him that there are quite a few. 
 Subsection (5) sets out the penalty on summary conviction when an offence is committed as imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale—that is, £5,000—or both. That shows the significance of the restrictions. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked about adoption societies, which clause 2(5) defines as bodies 
''whose functions consist of or include making arrangements for the adoption of children''.
 The ''illegitimate'' bodies to which the hon. Gentleman referred would include a person who set himself up as an adoption agency, but who was not registered as such and was not, therefore, subject to the quality control and monitoring that registration entails. With those assurances, I hope that the Committee will allow clause 90 to stand part of the Bill.

Jonathan Djanogly: Clearly, we need to prevent the production of fraudulent reports, but because the system does not always work properly, people go to independent consultants to move the process along. Under the provisions, could an independent consultant—even a high-ranking social worker with 20 years' experience who decided to go private—never produce a report?
 I recently spoke to prospective adoptive parents in a London borough, which I need not name, who were involved in two adoptions from the United States of America. They said that the system was so poor that the delays would have lasted for years, and that they had been forced to go to an independent consultant for a report. From what I can make out, the council was relieved that they did so because that removed its responsibility. I suppose that my question comes down to what the word ''prescribed'' encompasses.

Jacqui Smith: Similar points were raised in our discussions on intercountry adoptions in which we rehearsed at some length the problems with private home studies. We also discussed how we might tackle capacity issues, such as those raised by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly).
 Private home studies have been open to criticism for several reasons, the most important of which is that there is no way to verify that those who carry them out have appropriate qualifications or experience. We discussed the fact that there will be no way of identifying the necessary qualifications until the General Social Care Council becomes fully operational. Secondly, such persons who carry out studies cannot obtain full police checks on prospective adopters and adult members of the household, but only a printout under the Data Protection Act 1988 of information about current convictions. Thirdly, they cannot obtain from the prospective adopters' local authority information about relevant previous contacts with social services; and, fourthly, they cannot obtain impartial medical advice on the health of the prospective adopters. Fifthly, there are no peer review or management arrangements to oversee the work of those who carry out assessments. Finally, the case could not be considered on its merits by an adoption panel or separate decision maker. The 
 Kilshaw case and other high-profile intercountry adoption cases that have gone wrong have involved criticisms of private home studies and individual independent social workers by the judiciary. 
 As for the hon. Gentleman's point about capacity, agencies can choose to contract with independent social workers to undertake an assessment of adoptive applicants. That will allow additional capacity to be brought into the agency, and ensure that the necessary information is obtained and that checks and balances are built into the system. That, rather than the reinstatement of a system of private home studies, is the way to address problems of capacity. When we discussed establishing such a system, most hon. Members agreed that it would be unsatisfactory in terms of safeguarding the best interests of children involved in adoption.

Tim Loughton: I want to pick up a couple of the Minister's points. I agree with her on the matter of necessary safeguards, but the question is whether the provisions would squeeze out all home study reports produced by anyone other than approved social workers, adoption agencies and others.
 For two reasons, home studies are privately commissioned by individuals who want to adopt. One is that it has taken an interminably long time for one to be supplied by a local authority in its capacity as an adoption agency, as in the case mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, which involved a London borough. I am sure that such cases are common—I have come across many in which part of the problem of delay is getting someone to come round to start to produce a report. It is obvious that people who are frustrated by delays will commission their own studies. 
 The second reason why people might commission their own study is that they did not like the result of the first one from the local authority, and want one that is more favourable. In many cases, that would amount to an abuse of the system—unless there had been some degree of negligence and the assessment had not been made properly, although there are now various appeal procedures to cope with such cases, as we discussed in relation to other parts of the Bill. 
 Unless the Minister can guarantee a reduction in delays in the provision of reports by local authorities, demand for others to produce them will persist. She must assure the Committee that her Department will monitor delays in producing reports—there is wide variation between local authorities; for a host of reasons, some are much more efficient than others. If, as I suspect, she cannot guarantee that, she must allow for the continued provision of home study reports by private agencies that are properly regulated. My understanding was that because of the Care Standards Act 2000, police reports and various other innovations, there is now more of an infrastructure to monitor such agencies, and ensure that they are bona fide and produce completely objective and bona fide reports.

Jonathan Djanogly: If, in its role as an adoption agency, an authority did not produce a report within a certain
 time, would it not be a good idea to force it to contract out the production of that report?

Tim Loughton: That is an interesting practical suggestion, which might apply to many other services provided by public bodies. As things stand, it seems that we will have the worst of both worlds: enormous inconsistencies between the times taken for various local authorities to provide the professional report will persist, but the Minister will make it much more difficult for people to go elsewhere to commission a report.

Hilton Dawson: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Tim Loughton: In a moment. Without any proper checks that the reports are legitimate in the first place—[Interruption.] Oh dear—I am sorry, Mrs. Roe. I will give way.

Marion Roe: Order. I remind Committee members to check that their mobile telephones are turned off. As we all know, it is a breach of the rules to have them switched on in Committee.

Hilton Dawson: I am grateful to my fellow miscreant for giving way. I understand what he and the hon. Member for Huntingdon are saying, but is there not an inherent danger in a couple being able to commission a report that they need to be favourable? There are real difficulties with the Opposition's approach, and a serious distinction must be drawn between it and the argument being advanced by my hon. Friend the Minister, who is saying that any services would be commissioned by the local authority rather than the couple themselves.

Tim Loughton: I agree with nearly everything that my fellow miscreant says. Our proposed solution is not ideal. In an ideal world, all such reports would be produced by proper adoption agencies and local authorities, there would be no problem with their integrity and objectivity and they would be subject to the various appeal systems. Everyone agrees that that is the best way forward. However, the Minister must come clean about the delays in many parts of the country. If we do away with private reports and rely solely on social services departments and adoption agencies, those delays will continue—unless the Minister does something along the lines suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, or provides more resources to prevent delay. Otherwise, we must acknowledge the practicalities: people will go elsewhere because they are frustrated by the amount of time the process is taking, or because they want a second opinion. The second of those reasons is not a good one, and should be treated with great suspicion.
 There is a grey area in the middle of this issue. The safeguards should be greater, because if people are able to go elsewhere and consequently there is no pressure on local authorities to prioritise the production of home studies, those authorities will not do so, however much they might want to. The absence of such pressure may be a relief to some local authorities because of their workload and the constraints on their departments. If we speed up that system, private reports will wither away and those that 
 remain can be severely regulated. If we cannot speed it up, we must recognise that private reports will always have a role but that they must be much more closely regulated in order to legitimise them and make them more objective. If we do not take one of those options we will continue to swim around in the grey area. The time constraints will not improve matters, and the checks on private reports will not improve either.

Jacqui Smith: Part of the debate is based on a misunderstanding of current law. It is not currently possible to commission private home study reports for either domestic or intercountry adoptions. Hon. Members will remember that we discussed section 13 of the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999, which came into force on 30 January 2000 and which amended section 72 of the Adoption Act 1976 to include the assessment of prospective adopters in the definition of ''making arrangements''. By virtue of section 11 of the 1976 Act, the effect of that amendment was to ban privately commissioned home study reports and to make it clear that only a council or voluntary adoption agency may assess and approve an individual as suitable to adopt.
 I maintain that the current legal position is right. There should be a structure of accountability, monitoring and peer review for the process of producing an assessment report, which is, let us not forget, crucial to determining whether the child's best interests will be served by the adoption. Monitoring—post-placement and sometimes post-adoption—of the success of the placement, should also figure in the arrangements. My hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) made an important point about the inappropriateness of a direct contract between the relevant person and the person or organisation given the task of assessing their suitability to adopt a child or to continue a placement or adoption. That seems an incestuous and difficult relationship that does not serve the child's interests. 
 The points made by the Opposition focus on whether the process is currently quick enough. Under clause 90(1), the person who prepares the report must fall within the prescribed description. We shall consult on that, and the criteria I have outlined today and the need for monitoring and quality assurance will be a significant focus of that consultation. We are also taking measures to speed up the process of adoption and to make it fairer, through, for example, the national adoption register, the national adoption standards and the independent review panels. In those ways—not by reducing the quality of the process to enable things to be rushed through in a way that could be inappropriate or even dangerous for children—we shall ensure that children can be appropriately adopted more quickly. 
 As we have now had a lengthy discussion, I hope that the Committee will feel able to agree that clause 90 should stand part of the Bill.

Jonathan Djanogly: To return to the question of speed, the Government have stipulated that a planning application for a property should be determined within eight weeks, and every council must reveal at
 the end of the year the extent to which it has met that target. The process of adopting a child—a matter that I should have thought was somewhat more immediate, given the sensibilities involved—can sometimes go on for years. Is that right? Is not it reasonable to require that the reports should be produced within a set period, and that if they are not, the council should be obliged to have someone else produce them?

Meg Munn: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that prospective adopters have other options? It is not necessary that they approach only the local authority in whose area they live, and it is not unusual for prospective adopters to approach other local authorities or independent agencies. They do not have only one place to go. Furthermore, do not some authorities prioritise certain prospective adopters, such as those who want to adopt older children, because they currently have such children in their care, so that a couple wanting a younger child would be better advised to approach an independent agency or other local authority?

Jonathan Djanogly: The hon. Lady makes several important points with which I do not disagree. On the other hand, she illustrates many of the system's inconsistencies, which will not disappear under the Bill. While approaches to other agencies may be appropriate for people living in some council areas or boroughs—for example, her local council is known to be very slow—the fact that they are able to do so does not excuse those councils from their duty to do a better job.

Jacqui Smith: My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Ms Munn) makes a crucial point. We are not talking about restricting choice, or, as we shall discuss later, about not putting pressure on the system to ensure quicker adoptions. The system, which is not incoherent, contains choices between quality options that can safeguard the welfare of the child. The hon. Gentleman seems, surprisingly, to be arguing for a choice between a quality option and a slipshod option that would make things a bit quicker regardless of the welfare of the child.
 I do not want to repeat arguments that I have made before. The key point is that the restrictions are to do with ensuring that the adoption process works in the best interests of the child's welfare. Of course, time scales are important: that is why the Government have introduced the public service agreement target on time scales, which we published just before Christmas; it is why we have introduced much tougher performance management for local authorities; and it is why we shall publicly ensure that the performance of local authority social services departments is much more open to scrutiny. That is the reason we have already made progress in reducing the time that children spend in care before they are adopted. Those are the actions not of a Government who are unconcerned about time scales, but of a Government who want to speed up the process of adoption in a way that safeguards the interests of the child. The argument is about that fundamental issue.

Tim Loughton: There is a large degree of agreement on the clause, but the Minister—unintentionally, I am sure—still seems to be missing the point. Her remarks
 about the slipshod option identified the very concern that my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon and I tried to express. People approach other local authorities or adoption agencies—they have a wide choice—for reasons that relate to the points I made originally: either their local authority is taking too long, or they believe that the requirements of another local authority or adoption agency might be less stringent. The Minister mentioned a third factor—another quality option—involving the wish to adopt a certain type of child or the fact that a local authority is concentrating on a particular type of adoptive parent. Essentially, people's reasons for going elsewhere are either that it will be easier—if they have been rejected by their home agency—or that it will be quicker.
 We all want to speed up adoption, but the admission that people may have a choice between a quality option and a slipshod option is an admission that there are slipshod agencies. That is what we must bear down on. Such agencies are the target for improvements in speed, approach and the quality of the adoption services offered. However, I fear that that is not the problem that the clauses deal with. 
 We need to bring the slipshod option up to the standard of the others, so that good quality options exist in all parts of the country and people can expect a consistently high standard wherever they happen to live, or whichever agency they happen to approach first, whether a local authority or a voluntary adoption agency. I think that the Minister would agree with me. However, we have had a good discussion on the clause and we do not need to take the debate further. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 90 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 91 - Prohibition of certain payments

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move amendment No. 259, in page 50, line 5, leave out from 'in' to end of line 6.
 Having discussed restrictions on arrangements and reports, we come to the prohibition of certain payments. That safeguard is important because some individuals are prepared to engage in the despicable business of buying and selling children for adoption and do not recognise the needs of those children. It is essential that the welfare and needs of children be safeguarded. 
 The extent of the penalty in the clause acknowledges the seriousness of such activities. Individuals who are convicted face a prison term of up to six months, a fine of up to £10,000, or both. That is tougher than the current penalty under section 57 of the Adoption Act 1976, which the clause largely restates. The current penalty involves a prison term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding £5,000, or both. We are right to increase the penalty and thus the deterrent because children need protection. 
 The clause prohibits the exchange of any money in adoptions, other than that excepted in clause 92, which covers the payment of legitimate expenses incurred by adoption agencies and persons who apply or propose to apply for adoption or for the transfer of parental responsibility orders. Subsection (1) provides that the clause applies to any payment—other than the 
 payments set out in clause 92—which is made in adopting a child, consenting to an adoption, or removing to a place outside the British islands for the purpose of adoption a child who is a Commonwealth citizen or who is habitually resident in the United Kingdom. The subsection also applies to any payment that is made in connection with steps taken to arrange an adoption under clause 88(2), to which I shall return when I discuss the amendment. 
 Subsection (3) provides that an offence is committed if a person makes any payment to which the clause applies, agrees or offers to make any such payment, or receives, agrees to receive, or attempts to obtain any such payment. Subsection (4) provides for the toughened penalty that I outlined. It will ensure that there is a strong deterrent to discourage those who use financial reward to induce others to act in contravention of clauses 91, 82, 88 and 90. 
 The amendment is intended is to strengthen the connection between the steps taken under clause 88, which I spelled out in some detail, and the restriction in clause 91 on payments being made in taking such steps. Clause 88 makes it clear that only adoption agencies and persons acting in pursuance of a High Court order may take specified steps in relation to adoption, other than in certain circumstances—if the prospective adopter, or one of the adopters, is a parent, step-parent, relative or guardian of the child. 
 Clause 91 restricts the exchange of money in adoptions, and payments that fall under it are prohibited unless excepted by clause 92. As the Bill is currently drafted, clause 91(1) does not catch three of the nine steps specified in clause 88. Those are: 
''asking a person other than an adoption agency to provide a child for adoption''
 in clause 88(2)(a), 
''asking a person other than an adoption agency to provide prospective adopters for a child''
 in clause 88(2)(b), and 
''receiving a child . . . in contravention of paragraph (e)''
 with a view to adopting or allowing another person to adopt the child without an adoption agency being involved, which is dealt with in clause 88(2)(f). Therefore, any payment made for—or consideration of a person taking—any of those steps is not an offence. The amendment will make such payments unlawful and will ensure that clause 91(1) covers all nine of the steps in clause 88. 
 By including the three other steps under clause 91(1), we increase the safeguards for vulnerable children and provide the means to penalise those who make inappropriate payments, agree or offer to make such payments, or agree to receive such payments. For example, as well as those who approach a birth parent directly—under clause 88(2)(a)—we want to ensure that intermediaries are caught by the provisions. Someone who offered money to an intermediary would also be caught, such as a person offering money to someone involved in giving 
 advice and support to pregnant mothers or in providing care for children. 
 A person, X, might be eager to find a mother who is willing to give up her child for adoption; he approaches Y, a nurse who works in a maternity clinic, and offers Y money to approach new mothers who are experiencing problems and who might be persuaded that their difficulties could be easily resolved by giving up their newborn child for adoption. In respect of clause 88(2)(b), a parent may be unwilling to keep a child, but not want to put the child into the care of the local authority. That parent may offer money to an intermediary to find prospective adopters and then give the child up freely or negotiate some reward for the exchange of the child. The amendment would restrict that payment. Finally, in respect of clause 88(2)(f), those who, as part of a financial transaction, place a child with another person for that person or another to adopt will be penalised. 
 The Committee will agree that making payments in relation to adoption is inappropriate, except in specific and excepted cases. It is certainly inappropriate to use adoption to make a profit. The restrictions in clause 91, strengthened by Government amendment No. 259 with its explicit links to clause 88, provide the protection to ensure that such practices do not find their way into our adoption system.

Tim Loughton: We are in full agreement with the clause. The Minister is right to say that legislation must prevent people from profiting from adoption. However, I query the wording of what is left after the amendment—perhaps I missed an amendment debated earlier that adds to subsection (1)(d). I appreciate the steps outlined by the Minister, but as it stands the amendment simply deletes the last parts of the last three lines of paragraph (d) so that subsection (1) reads, in part:
''This section applies to any payment (other than an excepted payment) which is made for or in consideration of . . . a person (who is neither an adoption agency nor acting in pursuance of an order of the High Court) taking any step mentioned''.
 What is ''any step mentioned''? Surely, there must be a reference to particular eventualities in a previous part of the Bill; otherwise anyone who is not an adoption agency or acting in pursuance of a High Court order will be caught for ''taking any step mentioned''. I am sure that there must be a reason why the clause is worded in such a way, but it is not obvious without additional explanatory notes that explain some of the Government's amendments.

Elfyn Llwyd: I might be able to assist the hon. Gentleman. The amendment deletes to the end of line 6, so the subsection will read:
''mentioned in section 88(2)''.

Tim Loughton: That is the sort of explanation that I was after. If it is correct, I am happy to proceed with the clause.

Jacqui Smith: Perhaps I can help. The hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd)—

Elfyn Llwyd: Don't start that again.

Tim Loughton: Where's the bottle?

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy should deliver on his promises.
 The amendment will leave out from ''in'' to the end of line 6 only, so that the subsection will refer to 
''a person (who is neither an adoption agency nor acting in pursuance an order of the High Court) taking any step mentioned in section 88(2)''.
 I hope that with that clarification we can proceed. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: I have one technical query. How does the restriction in subsection (1)(c) relate to adoptive parents from abroad, who, making a payment for an adopted child from this country, then make a payment that covers travel expenses and other items? How is that excluded, so that they are not prosecuted for paying a fee that is not a profiteering fee?

Jacqui Smith: We shall debate clause 92, which relates to excepted payments, later. The intention of that clause is that precisely the sort of payment to which the hon. Gentleman refers would be included in the excepted payments, if it was ''reasonably incurred'' in relation to an adoption. For example, a payment made for the child's travel and for someone to accompany a child from one country to another would be excepted under clause 92, if that was done within the restraint of relatives or parents—I shall correct myself if that is not the correct restraint. The situation described by the hon. Gentleman would not be prohibited by clause 91.

Robert Walter: The clause is one of the more important clauses in the Bill, especially as it relates to intercountry adoptions. I should like to probe the Minister on the prohibition of payments. The clause is specific with regard to payments made in respect of
''removing from the United Kingdom a child who is a Commonwealth citizen, or is habitually resident in the United Kingdom'',
 but not in respect of children coming in the other direction. 
 Some of the worst examples of payments for intercountry adoptions relate to children who have been ''bought'' in other countries. Excessive payments have been made to agents in those other countries, some of them masquerading as lawyers and claiming extortionate fees for arranging adoptions. Will the Minister give me some assurance that either this or another clause—I may have been remiss in not examining the Bill closely enough—will cover those payments that we would all like to prohibit?

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter) rightly suggests that payments should not be made when bringing children into this country for adoption, if they are not under the auspices of an adoption agency or travelling with their adoptive parents. The hon. Gentleman's point is covered by the restrictions in clause 88 on arranging adoptions. There is a direct link between the restrictions on arranging
 adoptions and any payment that might be made for arranging them. I will correct myself if I am wrong, but I suspect that the situation outlined by the hon. Gentleman may be covered by the restrictions in clause 88. Therefore, it would be prohibited under clause 91.
 There is no excepted payment for a child's travel into the United Kingdom, as we require it to be accompanied by its adoptive parents in those circumstances. If an intercountry adoption had happened abroad, the child would have to return with its adoptive parents. That and the restrictions in clause 88 deal with the hon. Gentleman's concerns. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 91, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92 - Excepted payments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Robert Walter: Again, I wish to probe the Minister a little. The clause suggests that other payments can be made to a registered adoption society by a parent, guardian or person who proposes to adopt a child. I remind the Minister of clause 11, which relates to fees and about which we had extensive discussions. I even proposed a couple of amendments to it. It states that
''Regulations under section 9 may prescribe . . . the fees which may be charged by adoption agencies in respect of the''
 various provisions. 
 I wonder whether, under clause 92, the Secretary of State would also prescribe the excepted payments and some scale for them. If there is not some national scale or prescription, we leave the door open for adoption agencies to skirt around the law and tell prospective adoptive parents that a payment is excepted, and that they must write out the cheque as the matter is not covered elsewhere in legislation. Will the Minister state specifically what the excepted payments are, and whether a published scale will be available to those who are likely to be charged them?

Jacqui Smith: Once again, we repeat arguments about charges. I shall outline the point of clause 92 in excepting—making exceptions of—certain payments. The clause is necessary because of the strong restrictions that clause 91 rightly places on the taking of any steps involved in arranging adoption.
 First, I shall respond to the point specifically made by the hon. Member for North Dorset. Under section 57 of the 1976 Act, adoption agencies can recover from adopters and prospective adopters expenses that they have reasonably incurred in connection with the adoption of a child. That applies to domestic and intercountry adoption but, in practice, adoption agencies do not recover expenses in cases of domestic adoption. 
 Under the Bill, as we discussed on clause 11, it is intended that local authorities will not be able to recover expenses arising from domestic adoptions. However, under clause 11(2) and (3), they will be able to charge for specific services in respect of intercountry 
 adoption. We talked at some length about the justification for that and—I quoted the Department's guidance on intercountry adoptions—for the fact that such charges can be made only to recover expenses, so there can be no element of profit. We mentioned the disadvantages of setting a national rate, which would mean that some agencies might be given more in fees than their expenses. In some areas, agencies might not cover their expenses, which would make them even more averse to dealing with the problems of intercountry adoptions. It could lead to longer queues. That covers the hon. Gentleman's point. 
 Clause 92 provides that payments may be allowed, and so excepted from clause 91, in certain circumstances. Subsection (1) allows any payment made under the Bill when it is enacted, or under the equivalent provisions in Scotland and Northern Ireland—the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 and the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. That therefore allows the payment of adoption support allowances to an adoptive family—unless such a family was excepted under the clause, it might be prohibited by clause 91—and for the agency to use its discretion to charge for tracing individuals. 
 The other intention in clause 92 is to allow payments to be made for reasonable expenses. That includes legal and medical expenses in relation to an adoption, such as when expenses are incurred for applications and proposed applications to the court for adoption orders, applications for placement orders and applications for contact under clause 25. Clause 92 allows for payments to a local authority or registered adoption society for expenses incurred for arranging the adoption of a child whose country of origin is outside the UK. Such payments could be for preparation classes, medical reports, legal expenses, home study reports, schedule 2 reports and post-„adoption reports. 
 The clause also covers reasonably incurred travel and accommodation expenses when a child is taken out of the UK for adoption, as is permitted by clause 82(2). For example, a child's travel and accommodation costs would be excepted, as well as those of a person escorting the child. As I suggested, we are aware of some intra-family adoptions from the UK to the Indian sub-continent. When those comply with conditions set out under clause 82—hon. Members will remember that it is about the transfer of parental responsibility before a child leaves the country—we do not wish to penalise families for making such payments.

Robert Walter: I am grateful to the Minister for running through the possible exceptions. She described them several times as reasonable payments. I referred to clause 11. Fees would be reasonable payments, but surely there should be a requirement for transparency. Adoptive parents should not feel in danger of being hit with a bill for what some official or adoption agency thinks is a reasonable payment, but which is totally unexpected and which they might find difficult to pay. Within the context of the clause, I suggest that the
 Secretary of State or the adoption societies should be required to give potential adoptive parents some idea of the likely costs under the clause.

Jacqui Smith: There are two problems, which I addressed previously. First, there is no power for the Secretary of State to prescribe the level of excepted fees under clause 92. The hon. Gentleman has not proposed an amendment to alter that, so it remains the position. More significantly, to return to a point that we discussed at length in relation to earlier clauses, councils and voluntary adoption agencies are and will continue to be able to charge prospective overseas adopters a fee to cover expenses reasonably incurred.
 For the reasons that I have spelled out, it is not appropriate for the fee to be set nationally; it is more appropriate for it to be set locally, because each agency's costs will be different and its fees should be able to reflect them. A nationally set fee would lead to some agencies receiving more than their costs while others did not cover their costs, which might discourage them from making the assessments. 
 I explained when we discussed transparency that it is important that fees are made clear to prospective adopters. In addition, we went through the redress that would be available to prospective adopters through the complaints procedure if they felt that an agency had breached the condition that it should not recover more than its costs. We have covered those points. The hon. Gentleman is trying to reopen a previous debate, rather than focusing on the clause, which does not include the power to do what he proposes, even if—in policy terms—it were considered to be appropriate. I do not think that it is, for the reasons that I have given. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 92 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 113 - Restriction on advertisements etc.

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move, amendment No. 261, in page 63, line 38, after '88(2)' insert—
'( ) a person other than an adoption agency is willing to receive a child handed over to him with a view to the child's adoption by him or another'.
 We are, as I said earlier, moving on to a clause that covers not only restrictions on advertisements on the internet, but wider restrictions on advertising. 
 The new subsection provides that the restriction on advertising in clause 113 that I shall spell out will apply also to advertisements that indicate that someone other than an adoption agency is willing to receive a child handed over to him with a view to the adoption of that child by him or by another person. It seeks to ensure that there are adequate safeguards in place to protect vulnerable children. It is, as we have discussed, essential that the welfare and needs of children be safeguarded. 
 There are those who are prepared to engage in the buying and selling of children for adoption. Even if money does not change hands, nobody should be permitted to arrange private adoptions that are not 
 subject to the provisions, safeguards and quality standards that are applied to the processes of adoption that we have discussed. Only local authorities and registered adoption societies should make arrangements for adoption, and restrictions on advertising are an essential part of the Bill's safeguards to prevent the exploitation of children and protect their welfare. 
 Clause 113 restates, with amendments, section 58 of the Adoption Act 1976, which restricts the publication of advertisements indicating that persons other than adoption agencies are willing to make arrangements for the adoption of a child, and makes it an offence for parents or prospective adoptive parents to advertise their desire for adoption. There is a broad consensus on the necessity for the current restrictions on advertising, but clause 113 goes further. It is a UK-wide provision that imposes a new restriction on the distribution of such advertisements, on advertisements that a person is willing to remove a child from the UK for the purpose of adoption, and on the publication and distribution of information about how to make arrangements for the adoption of a child. 
 In addition, the clause also makes an explicit reference to the internet so that there cannot be any doubt that the Bill covers this new medium. The internet is providing agencies with a new and growing medium for reaching out to prospective adopters. That is appropriate, but it opens up the risk that some individuals will try to advertise illicit adoptions in this country. We do not want websites to advertise children for adoption in this country unless the advertisements are placed by adoption agencies. 
 Adoption agencies are increasingly and rightly looking to the broadcast media to help them recruit prospective adopters. A number of television programmes featuring children available for adoption have been transmitted in co-operation with adoption agencies. The example of the BBC shows how it is possible, when the advertisement is placed by an adoption agency, to ensure that children's interests are safeguarded. 
 The BBC has broadcast two programmes on adoption, both under the theme of ''A Family of My Own''. In January 2000 the programme featured single children and sibling groups available for adoption; more than 24,000 calls were received by the adoption agencies involved in the programme, and most of the children have since been placed for adoption. Another programme followed in April 2001, featuring successful adoptions. It featured adoptive families and told of their experiences and feelings about their adopted child. 
 Television and other media can be powerful tools for recruiting adopters, but such recruitment must involve an adoption agency to ensure that the welfare of any child is protected if, for example, a television programme advertises a helpline that gives personal details of a child to callers, or initiates an adoption agreement. The involvement of the adoption agency will ensure that there is no disclosure of confidential information and that the best interests of the children are maintained in the placing of what, in the BBC's case, was an appropriate and useful advertisement. 
 The provision places restrictions on advertising by third parties, permitting them to be placed only by or on behalf of an adoption agency. It does not prevent third parties from providing general information about adoption, promoting adoption as a positive option, or passing to prospective adopters interested in a particular child the contact details of the child's adoption agency. However, any attempt by a third party to pass on information about an individual child, including their contact details, would be caught by clause 88(2). Nothing in the clause prevents any organisation from spelling out the benefits of adoption, but there are, rightly, restrictions on the extent to which the arrangements for individual adoptions and information about individual children can be disclosed. 
 Subsection (4) provides for a penalty on conviction of up to three months in prison, or a fine up to level 5—currently set at £5,000—or both. 
 With the addition of amendment No. 261, clause 113 safeguards children's welfare through the careful imposition of restrictions on advertising while ensuring that the appropriate use of advertising for the recruitment of adopters is still possible. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: We fully support the amendment that the Committee has just approved, and the Minister's reasons for placing restrictions on advertisements. My only concern is to ensure that the provisions are watertight. I appreciate how difficult it must be to marshal all the new electronic forms of communicating and placing advertisements, such as through the internet. We all know that people have used loopholes to do that. However, my interpretation of the clause and the Minister's comments on amendment No. 261 lead me to suspect that some perfectly legitimate ways of distributing information may fall foul of the provisions, although I appreciate that the Secretary of State is given fairly wide discretion to make amendments.
 In the ''Challenge Aneka'' programme some years ago, Aneka Rice was challenged to smarten up a Romanian orphanage. I remember watching the programme. Aneka Rice, a BBC crew and all sorts of other people went out to Romania and came across this orphanage in the most appalling state, where children of all ages were housed in terrible conditions. Those people did a great job of trying to repair the accommodation. 
 I believe that the programme was one reason for the enormous flood of interest in adopting children from Romania. It had publicised the appalling conditions that many children suffer in such orphanages. Enough personal details were given about those children to identify them. Hand in hand with that was the assumption that people could help not only by donating money to the various charitable works being undertaken to improve conditions for those children but, implicitly, by offering to adopt. Because 
 of the lack of potential adopters in Romania and because the country was in a state—it was only a few years after the iron curtain came down—that programme implied that adoptive parents would be sought from outside Romania. 
 On my understanding, that programme could be thought to have distributed information to promote adoption and unwittingly, but possibly under the terms of the legislation, given information about children who could do with a better home and for whom adoptive parents could be found in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. It was a long time ago, but I believe that that was done without the obvious co-operation of a recognised adoption agency. 
 No one could say that there was anything malicious or underhand about the programme. Indeed, what it achieved was laudatory. Strictly speaking, however, a programme maker who sought to make a follow-up programme or an equivalent modern version of it could be prevented from doing so, which might be a bad thing. We do not want such examples as that programme to be caught by these otherwise necessary clauses. 
 On the same score, the Minister might like to say why Romanian adoptions have dried up since a moratorium was placed on them in July 2001. I gather that it has a lot to do with an extraordinary campaign by Emma Nicholson, a Member of the European Parliament who, on rather scant information, has brought to an end adoptions from Romania, although the state of childcare in that country leaves an awful lot to be desired. Many children still live in appalling conditions in orphanages, and adoption by supportive adoptive parents in the UK or elsewhere in the European Union where there is now a moratorium is greatly to be recommended.

Marion Roe: Order. I must remind the hon. Gentleman that his comments are outside the scope of the clause, although he has made his point well.

Tim Loughton: Thank you, Mrs. Roe. Your comment was well timed.
 I should like to make one more point in relation to the clause. It is notoriously hard to marshal the internet. Bearing in mind the nature of the internet and the difficulty of finding the originator of an advertisement or the disseminator of information, how does the Minister intend to make these clauses work, particularly with regard to a body or an individual seeking from a country that does not fall under UK jurisdiction to encourage some form of adoption in the UK? Has her Department had bilateral discussions with a view to enforcing the clauses in countries outside the UK, bearing in mind the fact that, when people advertise to adopt UK children or to find adoptive parents in the UK, the effect is felt in the UK? The financial authorities sought to come to such arrangements with other countries when various dubious organisations set up in overseas tax havens and advertised their latest ''get rich quick'' schemes in the UK. 
 I agree with the need for and thrust of the clauses but, where the internet is concerned, they will work, particularly on a global scale, only if provisions are implemented by authorities in other countries to ensure that the same considerations apply.

Jacqui Smith: I missed the programme that the hon. Gentleman mentioned.

Jonathan R Shaw: He has a great video collection.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham needs to get out more. He has raised an important point. Subsection (2) spells out—[Interruption.]

Marion Roe: Order. I must ask the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) and for Huntingdon not to hold sub-Committee meetings in the Room; I can hear a burble of conversation.

Jacqui Smith: I was drawing the Committee's attention to subsection (2), which clearly spells out which advertisements are restricted. I suspect that the programme did not contravene the proposed conditions that
''(a) the parent or guardian of a child wants the child to be adopted,
(b) a person wants to adopt a child,
(c) a person other than an adoption agency is willing to take any step mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e), (g) and (h) and (so far as relating to those paragraphs) (i) of section 88(2), or
(d) a person is willing to remove a child from the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption.''
 However, it is inevitable, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, that such programmes will draw interest in adoption. That is not necessarily a bad thing. What is important is that the safeguards are in place. We have discussed at length the intercountry provisions to be applied in the interests of the children, were such a programme to prompt someone to consider adoption. It is unlikely that the clause would catch the programme that he mentioned, but programmes that broadcast explicit details about children who are available for adoption should do so only on behalf of or with an adoption agency. 
 You made clear your views on Romania, Mrs. Roe, so I shall say only that I shall respond to the hon. Gentleman's parliamentary question on the issue with a little more information about the Romanian Government. 
 The hon. Gentleman is right that it is difficult to control the provision of information over the internet, and, as in the other areas that he mentioned, there are limits on what we can do. However, there are clear steps that the Government can and will take to avoid the problems that I mentioned. An internet service provider in the United Kingdom that hosts a website containing illicit information can be penalised if it fails to block access to that website once it has been notified of the problem. We therefore have a clear power as regards internet service providers that host websites in this country. 
 If the host internet service provider is based outside our jurisdiction, we will press it to close access to the illicit website or ask the authorities in that country to 
 take action. We will have no powers under the Bill to block access at the source or through a UK conduit internet service provider. However, my colleagues in the Department of Trade and Industry will soon consult on regulations to implement the e-commerce directive, which explicitly promotes co-operation between member states to meet the ends that we are discussing. Codes of practice may well give us the scope to ensure that we achieve our objectives as regards the internet. With that clarification, I hope that hon. Members will feel able to support clause 113. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 113, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 114 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 106 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 107 - Acquisition of parental responsibility

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: We can move fairly swiftly through the next group of clauses. A step-parent can acquire parental responsibility for a stepchild on marriage to the child's mother. Does parental responsibility automatically lapse if those individuals are subsequently divorced, or is the question subject to a parental responsibility court order as part of a divorce settlement? I am sure that there is an obvious answer. I see the Parliamentary Secretary scribbling fiercely and I am sure that she will respond quickly. The Bill is not clear on the point.

Rosie Winterton: Perhaps it would help if I first outlined the effect of clause 107. It inserts into the Children Act 1989 section 4A, to enable a step-parent to acquire parental responsibility for a child of his spouse, either by agreement between the step-parent and the parents who have parental responsibility for the child, or by order of the court. The measure is intended to provide an alternative to adoption where a step-parent wants to acquire parental responsibility for his or her stepchild.
 The advantage is that the provision will not remove parental responsibility from the other birth parent and will not legally separate the child from membership of the family of that other birth parent. It will enable step-parents to acquire a legal status in relation to the child for whom they are caring. Given that that will come about by order of the court, parental responsibility will not automatically lapse. It could be terminated only by the court. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman's question and that he will therefore agree to the clause.

Jonathan Djanogly: Under subsections (3)(b) and (4) of new section 4A, the court could, effectively, bring the arrangements to an end if they did not work out. The child would be listened to and the court would need to see whether the child had sufficient understanding. I
 have been thinking about whether we should also turn matters around. Why should the child's views not be heard in the first place, when it was proposed that parental responsibility be given?

Hilton Dawson: This is an excellent clause. I am sure that a large part of the delay in social services departments affecting adoption arises from the vexed question of step-parent adoptions, which can have little priority for overworked social services departments but which, nevertheless, are important for children, step-parents and natural parents. I welcome the proposal to enable step-parents fairly readily to acquire parental responsibility without all the pain, difficulty and frustration that loss of parental responsibility and of contact between the child and the wider family would cause to the birth parent with whom the child is not living. I very much hope that the clause will be widely used and that it will lead to the withering away of the use of step-parent adoptions. I can see no further use for such adoptions, given the content of the new provisions. This is a very important step forward. It is efficient, sensible and above all humane, and I welcome it.

Elfyn Llwyd: I agree; the clause is useful and important and brings into line a matter that needs to be dealt with. The hon. Member for Huntingdon asked the Minister why we could not turn the whole matter round. If, under subsection (3), the child has the right to apply to the court, why should the child not be consulted when the step-parent makes his or her application for parental responsibility? That would be perfectly logical and right and would extend the concept. The question is useful, and I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to consider it further.

Jonathan R Shaw: I should like to join my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre in warmly welcoming the clause. I remember, when I was a duty social worker, receiving calls from birth parents and having to explain to them that they would have to adopt their own child. The messenger was often shot. I was considered to be responsible—not true with regard to existing legislation, but to some extent true with regard to this Bill.
 It is beyond me how anyone could have dreamt up the idea that a birth parent should be obliged to adopt their own child. A constituent in such a situation wrote to me a couple of years ago. My right hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Hutton), the ministerial predecessor of my hon. Friend the Minister, wrote to me, stating that the Government were committed to removing the anachronism in order to facilitate a speedier process in which families could secure themselves and children could be adopted by their step-parents. My constituent was put off by the thought that they would have to go through the whole adoption process, and put the idea on ice. I hope that, when the Bill receives Royal Assent, that constituent's family and thousands of others will be able to take advantage of it. The legislation is long overdue, but represents a promise kept and is very welcome.

Robert Walter: I declare an interest in that I might benefit from the application of the provision, as I am a step-parent of a child, without parental responsibility, in the very circumstances set out by the clause. I want
 to probe the Parliamentary Secretary, because proposed new subsection (1)(b) states that
''the court may, on the application of the step-parent, order that the step-parent shall have parental responsibility for the child.''
 That is the alternative to proposed new subsection (1)(a), which states that 
''both parents''—
 birth parents— 
''may by agreement with the step-parent provide for the step-parent to have parental responsibility''.
 If the estranged birth parents decided for reasons that might in certain circumstances be vindictive that they objected to the arrangement, would the court get involved in lengthy litigation and debate among the three parties about the merits and demerits of the application, which might be detrimental to the child's welfare? Will the Parliamentary Secretary gives us some idea of what criteria she envisages the court applying?

Rosie Winterton: I am glad to be supported on the clause, which hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have welcomed. It is true that the adoption law review recommended that the law be changed to enable step-parents to acquire parental responsibility. The provisions also have the advantage of not removing parental responsibility from the other birth parent and do not, therefore, legally remove the child's membership of that birth parent's family. That is important, given that we have spoken throughout about what is in the child's best interests.

Jonathan Djanogly: Will the Parliamentary Secretary clarify the position on probate? Could a child have three or four parents and inherit from them all?

Rosie Winterton: I shall come to that when I have discussed the hon. Gentleman's point about taking the child's views into account.
 The provisions will apply the principles of the Children Act. In practice, the court will apply the welfare checklist. In some instances—where the child is a baby, for example—it may not be possible to take their views into account. None the less, the welfare checklist will include the child's wishes and feelings, and the court will be able to appoint an officer of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service to report on the child's views if that is felt to be appropriate. 
 I want to mention two other issues. First, it is open to a natural parent to oppose the granting of parental responsibility to a step-parent in court. As the hon. Member for North Dorset said, that may involve some wrangling, and the court will have to decide what is in the child's best interests. Such circumstances will inevitably arise.

Jonathan Djanogly: I would be grateful if the hon. Lady explained how the court will know what the child's feelings are, given that it need not necessarily consult.

Rosie Winterton: As I have said, the principles of the Children Act would apply, which means that the child's interests and welfare would have to be taken
 into account. If necessary, the court can appoint a CAFCASS officer to ascertain the child's feelings.

Jonathan Djanogly: The whole point of the clause is to provide a faster solution so that people do not have to go through the whole adoption process, and everyone welcomes that. However, a husband and a stepmother may make an application in which social workers are not involved to a great extent. There may, therefore, be greater scope for not finding out what the child wants.

Rosie Winterton: In any case before a court, what is in the best interests of the child will have to be considered, especially when one parent opposes the application. Because the welfare checklist in the Children Act will apply, it will be important for those interests to be taken into account. A point was made about inheritance. A child will be able to inherit from only the natural parent or when there is a will, so the acquiring of parental responsibility will not affect that. I hope that I have provided some reassurance about the views of the child being taken into account.
 As I have said, we believe that the provisions will be effective. They will improve the situation for step-parents while allowing the child to continue to have a legal relationship with the birth parent. I am grateful for the support that the Committee has given the clause, and I hope that it will stand part of the Bill. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 107 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 108 and 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 110 - Special guardianship orders

Jonathan Djanogly: On a point of order, Mrs. Roe. When special guardianship orders were discussed at our evidence-taking sittings, the Minister agreed to produce a report or letter of some sort that set out the tax and probate position of children subject to such orders. I reminded her of that some weeks ago, but the note has not appeared. It would have been helpful had it appeared by today.

Marion Roe: The hon. Gentleman will understand that that is not a point of order for the Chair. I am sure that the Minister has taken note of his point.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 256, in page 58, line 2, at end insert—
'( ) Section 41 applies in relation to proceedings in which any question of making, varying or discharging a special guardianship order arises as if they were specified proceedings for the purpose of that section.'.
 This is a long clause—if not the longest in the Bill. It is technical and comprehensive, and any further explanation and information that the Minister could have provided would have been helpful. Perhaps further information might be forthcoming later if we are still debating the clause. 
 Members on both sides of the House widely welcomed special guardianship orders and considered them a good innovation. We certainly support the 
 principle behind them. Concerns have been raised, some during the witness sittings, that the long-term stability and security that supposedly went with a full-blown adoptive placement would be removed in producing a halfway house—for want of a better phrase—between full adoption and fostering. That is a fair point, but special guardianship orders serve a purpose. They will need to be monitored closely when under way, but I am sure can be made to work. They should not be seen as detracting from occasions when full-blown adoption would be the most suitable course of action if properly conducted in a sustainable and secure family environment which could last in perpetuity. For those children who need to retain some links to birth parents for a host of reasons, the orders have a key role to play. 
 The amendment is the result of several representations from outside bodies, not least the Law Society, which was specifically responsible for its wording. The principle of the amendment is that children should have a greater say in special guardianship order proceedings and be properly represented. That is why the amendment states that 
''proceedings in which any question of making, varying or discharging a special guardianship order''
 should be ''specified proceedings''. I am not a lawyer, but I gather that that would involve making children or their representatives party to the orders. 
 We have debated the consultation of children and the role that children should play in adoption placement procedures. There has been agreement on some issues, but Opposition Members would have liked the Government to go further in including children in other matters. There is a greater requirement for children to be brought into the process of special guardianship orders as much as possible. More often than adoption orders, they will involve older children, who are much more party to their circumstances and why new arrangements need to be made owing to domestic problems with their birth parents or remaining birth parent. Therefore, it is much more important that the child have a voice independent of that of the local authority. 
 I gather that the Government's draft Bill included special guardianship orders as specified proceedings under section 41 of the Children Act 1989. In view of that, it would be useful if the Minister set out the Government's reasons for the change. I also gather that the appointment of a CAFCASS officer in appropriate special guardianship proceedings is to be provided for in secondary legislation. It would be useful to the Committee if the circumstances in which that was envisaged were clarified. 
 The amendment is probing, and I am sure that the Minister will welcome the opportunity to explain the change in thinking between the draft Bill and the one before us.

Julian Brazier: I should like to intervene briefly in the debate with a point that applies as much to the amendment as to any part of the clause. We have made rapid progress this morning, so as to spend a long time on the clause. It would be helpful if the Minister explained how special guardianship
 differed from the provisions available under the Adoption Act 1976, which also offered a special relationship. There is certainly a demand for such an intermediate status, as I think all members of the Committee recognise and welcome. However, given that there was not much enthusiasm the last time a halfway house was tried, it would be helpful if the Minister at some stage—perhaps later—explained why she considers the clause better than the original provisions.

Jacqui Smith: I start by apologising, in particular to the hon. Member for Huntingdon. In response to a request, which I think was from him, I ensured that full notes were made available to the Committee. I apologise if some issues were omitted. I cannot promise to have anything ready by this afternoon, but perhaps it will be possible to examine the issues raised by him in more detail.
 As the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham pointed out, the clause is significant because it makes provision for the new special guardianship order under the Children Act 1989. To provide some context and an introduction to the amendments, it might be useful if I fleshed out the proposals and explained where they originated. I cannot necessarily outline the differences between them and proposals made 30 years ago, as the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) requested, but I shall write to him to show how things have moved on. 
 The idea of the new status was proposed in the performance and innovation unit report following the Prime Minister's adoption review in July 2000. It received widespread support in the public consultation that followed. The Government subsequently made a commitment in the White Paper, ''Adoption: A New Approach'', to develop a new legal option called special guardianship, aimed at meeting the needs of children for whom adoption is not appropriate but who could still benefit from a permanent, legally secure placement. 
 I know, and members of the Committee have several times pointed out, that children value the sense of legal security and permanence that can come with a court order. The intention is therefore to give the special guardian clear responsibility for all the day-to-day decisions about caring for the child or young person and for decisions about his or her upbringing. However, in contrast to adoption, the order will maintain the basic legal link with the birth parents. They will remain legally the child's parents, though their ability to exercise their parental responsibility will be limited. They will retain the right to consent, or not, to the child's adoption or placement for adoption. 
 The White Paper suggested that special guardianship might be appropriate for some older children who might, for example, be in long-term foster placements, and who while not wanting to be legally separated from their birth parents could benefit from greater legal security and permanence; for some children being cared for on a permanent basis by members of their wider family; and for children in some minority ethnic communities that have religious or cultural difficulties with adoption as it is set out in 
 law. At present, such children would probably be looked after either by local authority foster parents or informally.

Julian Brazier: As the Minister knows, we are all in favour of the new measures, but will she reassure the Committee that where younger children, who have no views of their own, are concerned, the prejudices or customs—whatever term one wants to use—of birth parents from whom, for whatever reason, the child has been taken away, would not be a bar to full adoption?

Jacqui Smith: Obviously, the decision about adoption would be based on the best interests of the child, as is appropriate. We have spoken throughout about the Government's wish and intention to increase the number of children adopted out of care, and to ensure that that happens more quickly. However, the White Paper and the PIU concluded that some groups understandably still have difficulty with some of the legal aspects of adoption. We are not necessarily offering such people a choice between adoption and special guardianship, because it is unlikely that they would have opted for adoption. We are providing an opportunity for special guardianship orders to be made, with the permanence and other conditions that they create, as opposed to nothing. It is an important step forward.

Julian Brazier: This is an important point. The Minister has outlined a number of other cases, and one can think of other examples. For instance, the father may be dead and the mother permanently incapacitated in such a way that prevents her looking after the child but the child still regards her as mum. However, if a minority group is specifically opposed to adoption—we are dealing with younger children, who will have no views on the matter—the pre-eminence of the child's interests must surely dictate that it should not be allowed to block the adoption of children who might otherwise be satisfactorily adopted by people who do not share that view.

Jacqui Smith: As I suggested in my previous answer, it is important that the processes and the safeguards that we talked about in relation to clause 1 and the placement provisions are considered in such circumstances.
 The new order is also intended to offer more security and a better support package than a residence order. It is designed to be flexible enough to work in a range of situations—including in cases where there is extensive and regular contact with the birth family and in instances where that would not be appropriate but when it would nevertheless be desirable to retain the basic legal link between the child and the parent. The Government want the new order to be used successfully, and the Bill therefore places a duty on local authorities to make arrangements to provide support services for special guardianship placements. We shall discuss that in more detail under later amendments. We anticipate that those support services will operate in a similar manner to adoption 
 support services, and we intend to consult widely on the rules, regulations and guidance that will accompany the implementation of the provisions. 
 I shall go into more detail on the new sections to be added by clause 110. Proposed new sections 14A to 14G of the Children Act 1989 will provide for the new special guardianship order. They state who may apply for an order, the circumstances in which orders may be made and the nature and effect of the orders; and they allow local authorities to provide support services for special guardians. 
 Proposed new section 14A sets out who may apply for special guardianship and the process for making an application. People may apply jointly—they need not be married—and they must be aged 18 or over. Local authority foster parents may also apply with the leave of the court if the child in their care has lived with them for a year. When considering making a special guardianship order, the child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration and the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act applies. 
 Those who want to apply to become special guardians must give three months' written notice to the local authority, which must investigate and prepare a report to the court on the suitability of the applicants to be special guardians and any other relevant matters. Regulations will prescribe the matters to be covered in the report. We intend to use those arrangements to ensure a proper assessment process. The court cannot make an order unless it has received a report covering the suitability of the applicants. The Government intend to set out, in court rules, that an officer of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service is to be appointed in appropriate special guardianship proceedings to represent the interests of the child. I shall refer to that in more detail when I address the amendment. 
 Proposed new section 14B provides that, before making a special guardianship order, the court must consider whether a contact order should be made at the same time. The court may also allow the child to be known by a new surname and to be taken out of the United Kingdom for longer than three months. 
 Proposed new section 14C sets out the effect of the special guardianship orders, giving the special guardian parental responsibility for the child, as I described. Furthermore, while a special guardianship order is in force, the child may be known by a different surname or be removed from the United Kingdom for longer than three months only with the consent of all those who have parental responsibility or with the leave of the court. Although those decisions can be made at the time of the making of the special guardianship order, there are restrictions on that after a certain time. Special guardians must also take reasonable steps to inform the child's parents if the child dies. 
 Proposed new section 14D sets out the circumstances when special guardianship orders may be varied or discharged. Proposed new section 14E makes supplementary provisions, including allowing the court to set time scales for special guardianship proceedings to avoid unnecessary delay. 
 Proposed new section 14F makes provision for local authority support services for special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders. Each local authority must arrange to provide support, including counselling, advice and information and such other services as prescribed in the regulations. The Government intend to consult on the regulations prescribing the circumstances when local authorities must, at the request of special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders, carry out an assessment of needs for special guardianship services. We shall use the regulations to ensure that local authorities put in place a range of support services, including financial support, which will be available when appropriate for special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders.

Julian Brazier: I have a general question. Everything that the Minister has said is right, but will she reassure the Committee that the guidelines will be the same as those for adoptions? We do not want to set up a huge new body of expertise, with which our already overstretched social services departments will have to deal, for a niche in the market that may turn out to be worthwhile but, none the less, small. Will the special guardianship provisions follow the same guidelines as those for adopted children, except when there are obvious variations?

Jacqui Smith: There may be some areas of obvious difference in the two circumstances, but the hon. Gentleman makes an important point. It is likely that the adoption support services established for adoptive families and adopted children will be similar to those for special guardians and children subject to special guardianship orders. The hon. Gentleman is right in his view of the way in which local authorities should respond to the provisions. The Government will consult on the overall framework. It makes sense for links to be made between the support services.
 Subsections (4) to (9) of proposed new section 14F govern the assessment process and, when support services are to be provided, the arrangements for their provision. As with adoption support services, the needs assessment may be carried out at the same time as an assessment of a person's needs for any other purpose. 
 Proposed new section 14G obliges every local authority to establish a procedure for considering representations, including complaints made to them, in respect of special guardianship support services by special guardians or children subject to special guardianship orders.

Hilton Dawson: It is clear that the measure is important, but it is also clear that difficulties and disputes could occur when parental responsibility is shared. The parental responsibility of special guardians will outweigh that of birth parents, so should birth parents not be included in the category of people who can have their complaints considered under the provision?

Jacqui Smith: Matters concerning birth parents are best dealt with in relation to the making of the special guardianship order, rather than in relation to proposed new section 14G, which is about
 representations and complaints with respect to special guardianship support. We intend to use the powers to require authorities to establish complaints procedures for special guardianship support, modelled on the revised Children Act complaints procedure, to be established under section 26 of the Children Act 1989 as amended by clause 111.
 Clause 110 represents a substantial new set of provisions, delivering on the Government's commitment to create a new permanent order to meet the needs of children who cannot live with their birth parents, but for whom adoption is not appropriate. These complex provisions are designed for use in a wide range of circumstances and we intend to consult carefully on the details of their implementation, in order to ensure that we get that right. Although, as the hon. Member for Canterbury says, the provisions in the Bill are very detailed, it is not necessarily appropriate to include certain others. 
 That brings me smoothly to the amendment.

Tim Loughton: At last.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways. In one breath he complains that there is not enough information and in another, when I am trying to further his education, he complains that I have gone on for too long.
 The hon. Gentleman's amendment proposes adding a subsection to proposed new section 14A that would mean that a children's guardian would have to be appointed by the court in any proceedings relating to the making, variation or discharge of a special guardianship order, unless it was satisfied that it was not necessary to safeguard the child's interests. 
 Proposed new section 14A sets out who may apply for a special guardianship order and the process for making an application. Applicants must give three months' written notice to the local authority of their intention to apply for an order. That is to ensure that the local authority can investigate and prepare for the court a report about the suitability of the applicants to be special guardians, and other relevant matters. We intend to set out which matters should be covered by the report, and to use the regulations to ensure that there is an appropriate process for assessing the suitability of prospective special guardians. We shall consult on how the assessment process should work. 
 However, it is envisaged that statutory guidance will require the results of earlier relevant assessments to be taken into account—for example, where the applicants are approved foster carers. The provisions allow the local authority to engage the assistance of other organisations in preparing assessment reports. The experience of voluntary adoption agencies in assessment might make them suitable organisations to assist local authorities in that way. 
 The court cannot make an order unless it has received a report covering the suitability of the applicants to be special guardians and the involvement of the social services in the process. The requirements for what the report should cover will ensure that the welfare of the child and his interests are investigated and reported to the court. The 
 Government intend to set out in court rules that a CAFCASS officer be appointed in appropriate special guardianship proceedings. However, subject to consultation, we envisage a CAFCASS officer being appointed in most cases where the court considers making a special guardianship order. We shall want to consider carefully the circumstances in which an officer should be appointed in cases where the court considers varying or discharging such an order. That is particularly true where all the parties have given their consent, and it may not be appropriate for a CAFCASS officer to be appointed in such cases. 
 We shall consult widely before the court rules come into effect. They will set out the circumstances in which CAFCASS officers must be appointed and their duties in each case. We shall listen carefully to the views of stakeholders on that important issue, but we do not believe that the Bill should prescribe the power to appoint CAFCASS officers, because such a power already exists in section 41(6) of the Children Act 1989. 
 The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham alluded to the fact that proposed new section 14E(6) introduced in March would have had a similar effect to the amendment, but that that provision does not appear in the present Bill. We have consciously made that change for two reasons after further consideration and discussions with colleagues in the Lord Chancellor's Department. First, we have confirmed that the Children Act already provides the power to appoint CAFCASS officers. Secondly, we are convinced that the issue is best dealt with through court rules, rather than in the Bill, because that approach allows for greater flexibility. In a small number of cases, the involvement of a CAFCASS officer will not be necessary or desirable—for example, where there is no contention and all parties have given their consent to the special guardianship proceedings being used to consider the discharge of the order for an older child. 
 Opposition Members also raised the issue of children's ability to receive representation, and there are two broad options for independent representation. Either the children's guardian and legal advisers act in tandem to represent the child as a separate party to the proceedings or the CAFCASS officer provides a report to the court, which can cover the child's wishes and feelings. Older children can instruct their own lawyer if the court thinks that they are competent to do so, although that is very rare. Such children can receive public legal services funding. 
 In the light of those reassurances and of my explanation of the change to the Bill, I hope that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton: I am enormously grateful to the Minister for furthering my education, as she so uncondescendingly put it. I was not complaining half an hour ago about her explanation, although some of
 us rather lost the will to live part way through it. However, she took various interventions on matters that had nothing to do with the amendment, and I hope that we shall not impinge on your tolerance, Mrs. Roe, if we raise other matters in a clause stand part debate.
 I was grateful for the Minister's eventual explanation of the circumstances in which CAFCASS officers could be appointed, and it was useful to put those on the record. I am encouraged by her undertaking to consult widely on the use of such officers and on court proceedings. Uncharacteristically, she also went further towards explaining properly why the provisions in the draft Bill were changed. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating, when we see what happens with respect to court rules, but if what is envisaged is in the interest of greater flexibility, there is something to be said for it. 
 I am grateful for the explanation that has been given and sorry that my amendment took so much of the Committee's valuable time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 257, in page 60, line 12, after 'guardian', insert
'and, 
 (c) a birth parent'.

Marion Roe: With this, we may take amendment No. 258, in page 61, line 25, after 'guardian', insert
'and, 
 (c) birth parents'.

Tim Loughton: These are also probing amendments. All our remaining amendments to the clause are targeted on support services. We have previously debated the importance of adoption support services and such support services will have no less importance when applied to special guardianship. The amendments would add a third category to the prescribed persons who may, under proposed new section 14F(2), at their own request have an assessment of their needs carried out or, under new section 14G(1), formally make representations, including complaints, to a local authority. Under the Bill, prescribed persons would be, first, a child with respect to whom a special guardianship order was in force and, secondly, a special guardian. We want birth parents to form the third category.
 An interesting representation was made by the Family Rights Group to the effect that birth parents who kept up a contact arrangement with their children who were the subjects of a special guardianship order would obviously retain a closer interest in their children's welfare than would the birth parents of a child who had been adopted and responsibility for whose welfare had moved to a completely different sphere. Such parents are not accorded under proposed new sections 14F(2) and 14G(1) any right to assessment for support or any facility to make representations or complain, yet the effect of a special guardianship order would be to exclude them 
 from decision making, although some contact would be likely. 
 Surely, in view of that, the birth parents would need adoption support services to explain to them the procedure that was coming into effect and how they would fit into it with respect to future contact. It would be a big decision for them. After the order had been made, problems might arise with the contact provisions, giving rise to the need for counselling, support services for domestic problems, or other such help. If there is a case for other people involved in the special guardianship order process to have special guardianship support services and the facility to make representations, I do not see why birth parents should be left out altogether. Unless that is specified in primary legislation, I fear that it will be a low, if not non-existent, priority for local authorities to provide either of those two services for birth parents. That is the point of this probing amendment. Birth parents will play a greater role in special guardianship than that played in any adoption by those whose child is adopted, so why, apparently, have they been excluded from the process altogether?

Jacqui Smith: Proposed new section 14F(2) provides that the local authority may, and in prescribed cases must, make an assessment for special guardianship support services at the request of
''a child with respect to whom a special guardianship order is in force''—
 or— 
''a special guardian''.
 As I said, proposed new section 14G sets out that the local authority shall establish a procedure for considering representations and complaints from those two groups about the way in which the local authority discharges its duties under proposed new section 14F. 
 Although many of the services required to support special guardianship will be similar to those required to support adoption, as I suggested in response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Canterbury, there are fundamental differences between special guardianship and adoption, particularly in that special guardianship does not have a lifelong effect. Special guardianship involves neither the permanent loss of a child to adoption, nor the same complex issues relating to tracing relatives and obtaining information that we discussed in detail last week and which will be covered by the adoption support provisions. Some special guardianship orders will be made with the consent of all the parties, but others will clearly be contested. 
 Nevertheless, the Government believe that, because of the fundamental difference between adoption and 
 special guardianship, access to support for special guardianship should be more restricted than access to similar services for adoption. Our priority is to support the child and young person and his or her special guardians, and the provisions reflect that. In practice, many of the birth parents whose child is made the subject of a special guardianship order will already be in touch with social services. Some children may remain in the department's care. In such cases, depending on their need for services, the department may be able to help them. 
 The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham raised the issue of support for contact. The local authority has a general duty under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 to provide services for children in need, their families and others. In particular, they have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children living in their area and, so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children by their families.

Jonathan Djanogly: I have a straightforward, non-trick question. Does the Minister see special guardianship as a suitable scenario in a case where there should be no contact?

Jacqui Smith: Yes, it is possible to envisage a situation of special guardianship with no contact. I did not realise that the hon. Gentleman had been trying to trick me earlier, but I will have to keep an eye out for that.
 Section 17 of the Children Act is important, because under the provisions in the Bill it would be possible for both parents to seek help with, for example, expenses associated with fulfilling a contact order. Also, section 16 of the Children Act allows the court to make an order requiring an officer of the local authority to advise, assist and befriend a person named in the order, who could be a parent, anyone with whom the child is living, or the child. The order may only be made by consent and in exceptional circumstances, and lasts for up to six months. The power is not greatly used, but it is clear that it is available to require a local authority to supervise contact, for example. 
 I hope that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham recognises my arguments for the narrower scope for special guardianship support provisions, as well as the ways in which it is already legally possible to support birth parents in cases such as those he described. 
 It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Four o'clock.